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Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of the 2001 tax reform in Germany
on dividend announcement returns. With this major tax reform, the full imputation
system was replaced by the half-income system, which had a signiﬁcant impact on
the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains for most investor classes. In an
event study framework, we separate the tax eﬀect of dividends from their positive
signaling and agency cost eﬀects to oﬀer a more comprehensive picture of the valua-
tion implications of dividends in Germany. Controlling for signaling and agency cost
eﬀects of dividends we ﬁnd that the market response to positive dividend surprises
is more pronounced under the full imputation system, where dividends are gener-
ally more favorable to investors from a tax perspective, than under the half-income
system. Our results suggest that the observed decline in the dividend response coef-
ﬁcient is synchronized with the 2001 tax reform and hence attributable to the 2001
tax reform.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G35, G14, H3, G34
Keywords: Dividend Announcements, Taxation
11 Introduction
Miller and Modigliani argue that a diﬀerential taxation of dividends and capital gains has the
potential to make dividends value-relevant. In equilibrium, any diﬀerential between dividend
and capital gains taxes should be capitalized into equity share prices (Brennan, 1970). In the
U.S., dividends were traditionally taxed at a higher rate than capital gains at the personal level.
This tax penalty raises the question as to why dividends are paid at all. In contrast, under the
full imputation system in Germany that has been eﬀective until 2001, most investor classes, e.g.
individual short-term and corporate investors, had a clear preference for dividends. So, it might
be argued that there has been a tax rationale for dividend payments.
The 2001 Corporate Tax Reform in Germany (hereinafter 2001 tax reform or 2001TR) replaced
the full imputation tax system by the half-income system and involved a fundamental change
in the relative taxation of dividend income and capital gains for most investor classes thereby
eliminating much of the tax advantage of dividend payments over capital gains. Thus, the
2001TR provides a good opportunity to shed light on the question of whether dividends in
Germany have tax-related valuation eﬀects.
This paper investigates the impact of the 2001TR by analyzing dividend announcement re-
turns. Numerous empirical studies, especially for the U.S. market, have shown that dividends
have positive valuation implications due to the signaling and agency cost eﬀects (Aharony and
Swary, 1980; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Yoon and Starks, 1995; Amihud and Li, 2006).
Empirical studies on dividend announcement eﬀects on the German stock market also show
a positive (negative) market response to the announcement of dividend increases (decreases),
suggesting that in Germany dividend changes have information content (Brandi, 1977; Sahling,
1981; Amihud and Murgia, 1997; Gerke, Oerke and Sentner, 1997; Heiden, 2002; Gugler and
Yurtoglu, 2003). We examine how the market reacts to dividend surprises over the two tax
systems and, in particular, how the market response is related to the diﬀerential taxation of div-
idend and capital income. In an event study framework we separate the tax eﬀect of dividends
from their positive signaling and agency cost eﬀects to oﬀer a more comprehensive picture of the
valuation implications of dividends in Germany. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no
other study on the tax eﬀects on dividend announcement returns for the German stock market.
Under the full imputation system that has been in place until 2001, dividend income is tax
advantaged for German investors that actively trade or have substantial stockholdings, for Ger-
man individuals in lower tax brackets and for domestic corporations. Long-term individual
investors in higher tax brackets prefer capital gains over dividend income. With the 2001 tax
reform however there is a dramatic decline in the relative advantage of after-tax dividend in-
come over capital gains for all domestic shareholders irrespective of the category of investor.
Under the half-income system, most investor classes prefer capital gains over dividends or are
at least indiﬀerent between payouts or earnings retentions from a tax perspective. We therefore
hypothesize that the share price response to a given magnitude of dividend surprise, i.e. the
dividend response coeﬃcient, should absolutely decrease over both tax regimes and that this
decrease should be synchronized with the 2001TR.
Controlling for signaling and agency cost eﬀects of dividends we ﬁnd that the market response
to positive dividend surprises is more pronounced under the full imputation system. Our results
2indicate that the observed decline in the dividend response coeﬃcient is synchronized with
the 2001 tax reform. Using the individual ﬁrm’s ownership structure we construct a holding
clientele-based measure to proxy for the tax attributes of the marginal investor and to account
for cross-sectional variations in individual investor’s dividend taxation. Our holding clientele-
based measure however produces inconclusive results, as we do not ﬁnd considerable eﬀects on
dividend surprises resulting from cross-sectional variations in the dividend taxation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the
literature and the German tax environment and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
research design, data and statistical methodology. The fourth section discusses the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature and Hypotheses
2.1 Signaling and Agency Cost Arguments of Dividends
Dividends have information content due to the existence of information asymmetries and in-
complete contracts and they mitigate agency cost problems. The cash ﬂow signaling hypothesis
implies a monotonic positive relation between unexpected changes in dividend policy and changes
in shareholder wealth as costly dividends can be used to signal future cash ﬂow, thus reduc-
ing the level of information asymmetry (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and
Williams, 1985).
Jensen considers the agency conﬂict between outside shareholders and inside managers and
the agency cost eﬀect of free cash ﬂow. Firms with poor investment opportunities may reduce
agency costs and thus increase shareholder value by distributing free cash ﬂows to shareholders.
Hence, paying dividends can be an eﬀective instrument to prevent managers from investing in
negative net present value projects, reducing the severity of the management-shareholder agency
cost problem and enhancing ﬁrm value.
Gugler and Yurtoglu develop an alternative agency cost-based explanation of why dividend
changes aﬀect shareholder value which suits the particular Continental European and German
corporate governance framework. In Germany, we observe a corporate governance system which
is characterized by concentrated share ownership (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Becht and Boehmer,
2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Mayer, 2008; Andres, 2008) and weak minority shareholder pro-
tection (La Porta etal., 2000). Within such an institutional framework we expect, on the one
hand, conﬂicts of interest between owners and managers in widely held ﬁrms but additionally,
on the other hand, conﬂicts of interest between large block holders and minority shareholders in
ﬁrms with concentrated ownership. Shleifer and Vishny formulate the rent extraction hypothesis
which focuses on the conf1ict between the large controlling owner and the small outside share-
holders and on the discretion and incentives of the controlling owner to extract private beneﬁts
of control. Gugler and Yurtoglu argue that dividends, as a pro-rata pay to all shareholders, are
a device for limiting rent extraction at the burden of minority shareholders. Accordingly, divi-
dend change announcements provide new information about this conﬂict. The rent extraction
hypothesis also suggests that dividends are positively related to equity value.
Though distinct, the signaling and the agency cost theories of dividends are not mutually
3exclusive. Both predict a positive market response to dividend surprises. Empirical evidence on
U.S. data trying to separate both theories however is mixed with numerous studies supporting
either the cash ﬂow signaling hypothesis (Aharony and Swary, 1980; Yoon and Starks, 1995;
Bernheim and Wantz, 1995; Amihud and Li, 2006) or the agency costs arguments of dividends
(Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). Examining data on the German stock market from 1992 to 1998,
Gugler and Yurtoglu provide some evidence in favor of the Jensen free cash ﬂow and partially
of the rent extraction hypothesis. Addressing the dividend signaling hypothesis by examining
the post-announcement operating performance of German companies, Savov does not ﬁnd any
evidence that dividend increases convey information about future operating performance.
2.2 Dividends and Taxes
Amongst other approaches,1 researchers have investigated whether and how a diﬀerential taxa-
tion of dividends and capital gains aﬀects dividend announcement returns (Bernheim and Wantz,
1995; Li, 2007; Bajaj and Vijh, 1990; Siddiqi, 1997). Bernheim and Wantz explore time series
variations in U.S. investors’ taxation in order to diﬀerentiate between signaling models and other
dividend-preference theories. Dividend signaling models predict that ﬁrm value is more sensitive
to a more costly signal: For a given change in dividend yield there should be a monotonic rela-
tionship between the costs of the tax burden of dividends2 and the market response to dividend
surprises. On the other hand, agency cost arguments imply that an increase in relative taxation
should decrease the after-tax value of dividends. Examining U.S. data from 1962 to 1988, Bern-
heim and Wantz show that the share price response per dollar of dividend is positively related
to the relative after-tax income on dividends over the after-tax capital gains. This is consistent
with the prediction of tax-based dividend signaling models.
In a more recent study using U.S. data from 1989 to 2000, Li provides evidence that the market
response to dividend surprises decreases as the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains
increases over several tax reforms. This is consistent with the argument that a dividend tax
penalty partially oﬀsets the positive signaling and agency cost eﬀects of dividends. Furthermore,
Li shows that this negative tax eﬀect is mitigated by the presence of a marginal investor whose
dividend income is relatively less tax-disadvantaged.
Other studies attempt to separate the tax and information eﬀects of dividends by examin-
ing diﬀerent tax clienteles. Bajaj and Vijh argue that if investors whose dividend income is
tax advantaged are the marginal investors in high-dividend yield stocks, the price reaction to a
dividend change should be larger, the higher the anticipated yield of the stock. Tax and infor-
mation eﬀects reinforce each other in high-yield stocks. Siddiqi uses ex-dividend day returns as a
proxy for the identity of the marginal investor on the announcement day. Supporting Bajaj and
Vijh, Siddiqi shows that abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly more pronounced in stocks where
the marginal investor has a tax preference for dividends rather than in tax penalized stocks.
1For example, the CAPM-based studies (Brennan, 1970) on the dividend tax capitalization hypothesis test
whether a tax-penalized dividend yield is a priced factor (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; Litzenberger
and Ramaswamy, 1982; Black and Scholes, 1974; Fama and French, 1998; Dhaliwal, Zhen Li and Trezevant,
2003; Dhaliwal etal., 2005) while other works explores the eﬀect of taxation on ex-dividend day price behavior
(Elton and Gruber, 1970; Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2005; Whitworth and Rao, 2010) each approach yielding
incloncusive results.
2dividends were tax-penalized relative to capital gains in the U.S. until 2003
4For Germany, empirical studies that address the question of whether there are tax-related val-
uation eﬀects of dividends primarily focus on ex-dividend day stock behavior (Bay, 1990; McDon-
ald, 2001; Lasfer, 2008) or test whether a diﬀerential taxation of dividends and capital gains is
capitalized into stock prices (Murphy and Schlag, 1999; König, 1990). Examining the tax-based
dividend signaling hypothesis for Germany, Amihud and Murgia have been the ﬁrst to address
the diﬀerential taxation of dividends and capital gains to dividend announcements. They argue
that under the full imputation system dividends are tax-advantaged for most investor classes
and, hence, taxes do not constitute a form of signaling cost. Tax-based dividend signaling mod-
els predict that, absent the necessary conditions of higher dividend taxation, announcements of
dividend changes should not induce a market reaction. However, Amihud and Murgia ﬁnd posi-
tive (negative) announcement returns to dividend increases (decreases) suggesting that dividend
changes have information content that is related to other factors.
2.3 The tax environment in Germany
To analyze the tax environment in Germany and the implications of the enactment of the half-
income system in 2001, we construct a tax discrimination variable in line with Poterba and
Summers and Schulz that captures the tax diﬀerential between dividends and capital gains. In
the simple case of a classical tax system, the ratio of the after-income tax on dividends over the














y is the ﬁrm level tax rate if year y’s earnings are distributed, τc,re
y is the ﬁrm-level
tax rate if earnings are retained, τd
y is the eﬀective investor-level income tax rate on dividends,
and τg
y is the eﬀective income tax rate on capital gains. The German local business tax is
neglected because it is levied on both retained and distributed earnings and has not been changed
systematically in the course of the 2001TR. Θy assumes that one unit of retained earnings
generates one unit of capital gains.3 If Θy is larger than unity then, from a tax perspective,
investors will prefer dividend income over capital gains.
Until the 2001TR, Germany operated a combination of a split-rate corporate tax and full
imputation tax system. At ﬁrm level, distributed proﬁts were subject to a lower corporate
tax rate of 30% than retained earnings (45% until 1998 and 40% thereafter). Under the full
imputation system, dividends paid by domestic corporations entitled domestic taxable investors
to a tax credit equal to τc,d/(1−τc,d) per dividend received. Dividends are eﬀectively not taxed
at the ﬁrm level as domestic taxable investors are eligible to claim the full corporation tax paid
on dividends. There is still an additional tax on distributed proﬁts, a withholding tax, τwh, of
25%, that is deducted at source from the dividend paid to shareholders. This tax, however, can
also be fully claimed by domestic investors against their income tax liability. Formally, the ratio
of the after-income tax on dividends over the after-tax capital gains under the full imputation
3It is implicitly assumed that retained earnings are reinvested in capital value-neutral projects and are not paid
out in the future. Moreover, dividend and capital gains taxes are supposed to be paid simultaneously.














The relative tax preference for dividends over capital gains generally depends on the tax status
of the diﬀerent type of shareholder. We consider two categories of shareholders: Domestic indi-
vidual investors (i.e. German citizens) and taxable German corporate investors (i.e. commercial
and industrial ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions and insurers).
For domestic individual investors, dividends are eﬀectively subject only to the individual in-
come tax rate. The individual income tax rate, τind
y , declines from a range of 25.9% to 53.0%
in 1996 to a range of 19.9% to 48.5% in 2000/2001. Long-term capital gains from shares that
are held for more than six months4 are tax-exempt for individual shareholders if they have no
substantial interest in these shares. The threshold for non-substantial interest is deﬁned as
shareholdings below 25% up to 1998, below 10% from 1999 to 2001, and below 1% thereafter.
Short-term capital gains and capital gains for shareholders with substantial interest are taxed
at the personal income rate. Both, corporate and individual tax rates are increased by a soli-
darity surcharge. The solidarity surcharge decreases from 7.5% to 5.5% over the sample period.
German corporations’ dividend and capital gain income is fully taxed at the corporate level.
However, for dividends, the full tax credit is granted to corporate shareholders, thus, dividends
are again only taxed once. The applicable tax rate of the dividend receiving corporation depends
on whether the earnings of the target company are retained or distributed.
Table 1 reports a numerical simulation of Θyj for diﬀerent investor classes j, i.e. high and
low tax-bracket individual investors, corporate investors and foreign investors. The tax discrim-
ination variable is calculated for individual investors in the highest and lowest tax bracket and
further divided into investors whose capital gains are taxable (τg
y = stand.) and investors with
tax-exempt capital gains (τg
y = 0). If capital gains are taxed with the nominal personal income
tax rate (τg
y = stand.) as a result of selling substantial holdings or holding stock for less than six
months, then Θyj is the inverse of the after-tax retained earnings, i.e. 1/(1 − τc,re
y ). Long-term
individual investors with non-substantial interests do not pay any capital gains taxes. Here,
for high tax payers, Θyj is 0.83 in 1996, decreases to 0.80 in 1999, and (due to a reduction in
personal income tax rates) increases slightly to 0.84 in 2000/2001. For long-term individual
investors in the lowest tax bracket, Θyj is 1.40 in 1996, and moves through a series of smaller
changes in tax rates to 1.37 in 2000/2001. For corporate investors, capital gains are taxed as
corporate income, so that the relative tax burden for corporations is equal to that of individuals
with taxable capital gains.5
Under the full-imputation system, dividend income is preferred by German investors that
actively trade or have substantial stockholdings, by German individuals in lower tax brackets
and by domestic corporations. Long-term individual investors in higher tax brackets and foreign
investors prefer capital gains over dividend income.
4After 1999 a stock has to be held for at least one year in order to receive tax free capital gains.
5Although domestic corporate investors must treat realized capital gains as normal taxable income they may
always have deferred capital gains taxation through a buy-and-hold strategy. Hence, the tax preference for
dividends could be considerably lower under both, the full imputation and the half-income system.
6With the 2001TR, there is a dramatic decline in the relative after-tax dividend income over
capital gains for most investor classes. With the replacement of the full imputation system
by the half-income system only half of the distributed proﬁts of a corporation are included
in the shareholders’ taxable base. In return, the imputation of corporate tax credits is no
longer possible and corporate income is taxed consistently, irrespective of whether proﬁts are
distributed or retained within the ﬁrm. Formally we can write the tax discrimination variable









Table 1 shows that Θyj declines with the 2001TR irrespective of the category of investor.
Individual investors whose capital gains are taxable with the nominal income tax rate and
corporate investors are now indiﬀerent between dividend income and capital gains, Θyj = 1.
Long-term individual investors with non-substantial interest now always prefer capital gains over
dividend income: For investors in the highest tax bracket, Θyj declines from 0.84 for dividends
paid out of year 2000 earnings to 0.74 in 2001 and from 1.37 to 0.90 for low-taxed investors.
The increase in the tax discrimination variable from 2001 to 2006 for individual investors whose
capital gains are tax exempt is attributable to the decrease in the personal income tax rates.
So far, we did not consider foreign investors. While a description of global taxation is far
beyond the scope of this article, we brieﬂy outline some general important issues. Foreign
investors are not entitled to a tax credit by the German ﬁscal authorities, i.e. the corporate
tax credit and the withholding tax, and might be subject to double taxation with regard to
dividends under the full imputation system. Moreover, over the last decades dividend income
has generally not been tax favored relative to capital gains for foreign investors in most major
Table 1: Tax Discrimination Variable Θyj
Year Regime Individual Investor Corporate
Highest Tax Bracket Lowest Tax Bracket Investor
τ
g
y = stand. τ
g
y = 0 τ
g
y = stand. τ
g
y = 0
1996 FI 1.94 0.83 1.94 1.40 1.94
1997 FI 1.94 0.85 1.94 1.41 1.94
1998 FI 1.90 0.84 1.90 1.42 1.90
1999 FI 1.73 0.80 1.73 1.31 1.73
2000 FI 1.73 0.84 1.73 1.37 1.73
2001 FI/HI 1.73/1.00 0.84/0.74 1.73/1.00 1.37/0.90 1.73/1.00
2002 HI 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.90 1.00
2003 HI 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.92 1.00
2004 HI 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.92 1.00
2005 HI 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.92 1.00
2006 HI 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.92 1.00
This table presents the evolution of the tax discrimination variables, Θyj, for diﬀerent investor classes j, where y is the
ﬁscal year for that a dividend is paid or earnings are retained under the assumption that announcement and payment is
made in the following calendar year. The tax discrimination variable is the ratio of investor’s after-tax dividend income
over the after-tax capital gains assuming that 1 unit of retained earnings generates 1 unit of capital gains. FI is the full
imputation system until 2001 and HI is the half-income system. Investor classes are individual investors in the highest and
the lowest tax bracket and corporate investors Θyj is calculated for individual investors whose capital gains are taxable, τ
g
y
= stand., and indivudual investors with tax-exempt capital gains, τ
g
y = 0. For a description of the calculation of Θyj for
diﬀerent investor classes under both tax system see section 2.3.
7countries.6 Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that most foreign investors should prefer capital
gains over dividends under the full imputation system. With the removal of the dividend tax
credit, foreign investors are no longer tax-disadvantaged compared to German investors by not
receiving an imputation credit. In contrast, the introduction of the symmetric taxation of
retained and distributed corporate income with the 2001TR increases the after-tax value of
capital gains. We assume that the relative tax preference of dividends over capital gains does
not substantially change with 2001TR for most foreign investors.
To conclude, the arguments suggest that the share price response to a magnitude of dividend
surprise should absolutely decrease over the sample period with a sharp decline around the 2001
tax reform. However, if domestic individual investors in the highest tax bracket, whose capital
gains are not taxed, are the marginal investors, the decline should be less distinct.
2.4 Hypotheses
Under the full German full imputation system dividends are not tax-disadvantaged and in fact
are taxed lower for most investor classes until 2001. In absence of the necessary conditions for
tax-based signaling models of higher dividend taxation, the empirical ﬁndings of Amihud and
Murgia and other studies on the German stock market suggest that factors other than tax-
based signaling might explain the information content of dividend surprises. For example, prior
empirical examinations of dividend surprises in Germany ﬁnd agency-cost related factors that
can explain announcement returns. However, prior studies do not explicitly control for dividend
tax eﬀects. Since lower tax rates on dividends relative to capital gains increase the after-tax
value of dividends over capital gains, this tax eﬀect should reinforce the positive signaling and
agency cost eﬀect. Hence, if we do not control for tax eﬀects, the positive market reaction
to unexpected dividend announcements is overestimated. In contrast, if dividends are tax-
disadvantaged relative to capital gains for the marginal investor, a tax penalty should partially
oﬀset the positive announcement returns to dividend surprises. We therefore formulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The relative after-tax income of dividends and capital gains, measured by Θ, is
positively related to the market response to a given magnitude of dividend surprise. Thus, the
market reaction to dividend surprises is more pronounced if the tax rate on dividends is lower
than on capital gains.
Our analysis of the German tax framework suggests that with the replacement of the full
imputation tax system by the half-income system, the relative after-tax income of dividends to
capital gains is reduced for most investor classes. Our second hypothesis therefore is:
Hypothesis 2 Attributable to the 2001 tax reform, the market reaction to a given magnitude of
dividend announcement is stronger under the full imputation system than under the half-income
system.
While hypothesis 2 considers the time-series variations in the relative taxation of dividends
and capitals gains, one might also expect to observe tax-related valuation eﬀects due to cross-
6La Porta etal. and Ferreira, Massa and Matos survey dividend tax preferences for long-term investors in most
major countries in 1995 and 2007, respectively.
8sectional variations in investors’ taxation. In situations where the marginal investor’s dividend
income is relatively less tax-disadvantaged as compared to other investors, one would expect
this tax eﬀect to reinforce the signaling and agency cost eﬀects. In contrast, the announcement
returns for stocks that are traded by relatively dividend-tax-disadvantaged investors might be
expected to be mitigated by a negative tax eﬀect. We will proxy for the identity of the marginal
investor using a holding-clientele based measure. Our third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3 In the presence of investors whose dividend income is relatively less tax-disadvantaged
compared to other investors, the market reaction to a given magnitude of dividend surprise is
more pronounced.
3 Research design
Theory of market eﬃciency (Fama and French, 1998) suggests that the market response to
dividend announcements is positively related to the unexpected part of the announcement. The
information content of the magnitude of the unexpected portion of the dividend announcement
is measured by the dividend response coeﬃcient, α1:
AR = α0 + α1Dividend surprise + .
If a dividend surprise provides new information to the market, the dividend response coeﬃcient,
which Bernheim and Wantz call the "bang-for-the-buck", is expected to be positive (α1 > 0).
Positive dividend surprises induce positive abnormal returns (AR) around the dividend an-
nouncement, and vice versa. We test how the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains
inﬂuence the market response to a given magnitude of dividend surprise, α1.
3.1 Measurement of abnormal returns
We measure the market response to the announcement of dividend payments using standard
event-study methodology. Based on the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985), the abnormal
return ARit for ﬁrm i on day t is calculated as ARit = Rit−(c αi+ b βiRmt), where Rit is the return
of ﬁrm i on day t, and Rmt is the return on the CDAX value weighted market index7 on day t.
The coeﬃcients c αi and b βi are OLS estimates obtained from regressions of ﬁrm i’s daily returns
on the market return over the estimation window [-121;-2] relative to the announcement day
(t = 0)). We use two measures of abnormal returns: The cumulative average abnormal returns
for N stocks observed, CAAR−1,+1, measured over the three-day interval centered on the event
day and the average abnormal return on the announcement day, AAR0. The statistical tests
are based on the standardized cross-sectional t-statistic proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci and
Poulsen and the non-parametric Corrado test statistic.8
7The CDAX is a broad, value-weighted German index and comprises all shares listed in the prime and general
standard on the Frankfurt stock exchange.
8While the Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen test statistic is robust against event induced increases in the
variance of abnormal returns, the rank test of Corrado is robust against event clustering, i.e. overlapping
event windows. This is particularly useful within the German institutional framework, where most dividend
announcements are made annually in the ﬁrst months of the year.
93.2 Measurement of Θ
The standard approach to measuring the relative tax burden on dividends and capital gains
assumes that each investor’s tax parameters aﬀect the aggregate tax preference for dividends
over capital gains in proportion to the investor’s ownership of corporate stock (Poterba, 2004).
In line with the studies of Bernheim and Wantz and Li, we use an aggregate tax discrimination
variable, Θy. We calculate Θy for each year y of our sample period applying aggregate equity






The tax discrimination variables for diﬀerent investor classes, Θyj, are provided in table 2. Fol-
lowing da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog the ownership weights wyj are gathered from stock
market statistics provided by the German central bank in Deutsche Bundesbank. This source
provides yearly information of the total holdings of German stocks for the following sectors: Pri-
vate households, non-ﬁnancial domestic corporations, public authorities, domestic monetary ﬁ-
nancial institutions (e.g. public and private banks), domestic other ﬁnancial institutions (mainly
open investment funds), insurance companies and non-residents. We consider the ﬁrst share-
holder level. The taxation of shareholders at lower levels of a pyramid ownership structure are
ignored.10 Although Θy does not measure the tax treatment of any particular investor it reﬂects
the movements in the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains over the sample period.
For our analysis private households and domestic other domestic ﬁnancial institutions are
summarized in the individual investor class. Other domestic ﬁnancial institutions mainly com-
prise investment funds that can be supposed to be ultimately owned by private investors. We
assume that individual investors are long-term investors without substantial interest. We fur-
ther suppose that it is predominantly the more wealthy individuals who invest in shares, thus
individual investors are assumed to be taxed in the highest tax bracket. In the class of cor-
porate investorwe sum up the holdings of non-ﬁnancial domestic companies, public authorities,
domestic monetary ﬁnancial institutions, and domestic insurance companies.
Table 2 shows the percentages of shares traded on German stock exchanges that were in
hands of our domestic individual investor and domestic corporate investor classes along with
the resulting sample mean Θy for the years 1996 to 2006. The ownership share assigned to
individual investors is relatively stable over the sample period varying between around 29.3% to
35.7%. The aggregate tax discrimination variable decreases from 1.61 for dividends paid out of
results for ﬁscal years ending in 1996 to 1.44 in 2000. In year 2001 we observe a signiﬁcant drop
9To account for minor diﬀerences in the annual tax discrimination variable between ﬁrms with calendar and
ﬁrms with non-calendar ﬁscal years, we use the following calculation method of Θy: We ﬁrst calculate the
total tax burden on dividends and capital gains for each investor class for a speciﬁc ﬁrm-year observation.
Thereby, we consider the speciﬁc ex-dividend date of that observation and the investor’s tax rates applying to
dividends paid on that date. For example, if a dividend is paid out of income earned in a ﬁscal year ending
in the same calendar year where the dividend is paid, diﬀerent tax rates may apply than in cases where the
dividend is paid in the next calendar year. Then, we weight the resulting Θyj for the respective investor class
for each ﬁrm-year observation with the aggregate ownership weights of the calendar year in which the ﬁscal
year ends.
10This assumption is reasonable since top-level shareholders can optimize their own cash ﬂow to the ultimate
owner.
10in Θy to 0.92 for ﬁrms with calendar year-ends that follow the rules of the half-income system
for the ﬁrst time. For ﬁrms with non-calendar ﬁscal year-ends we obtain a tax discrimination
variable of 1.44 for year 2001. With the 2001TR, dividends become relatively tax-disadvantaged
with respect to capital gains. The tax discimination variable ranges from 0.91 in 2002 to 0.93
in 2006.
3.3 Measurement of dividend surprises
It is crucial to use an appropriate measure of dividend surprises. If markets are assumed to be
semi-strong eﬃcient in the Fama-sense, stock price reactions should only occur if we observe
dividend changes that deviate from their expected change, hence if they are unanticipated by
the market. Nevertheless, the majority of empirical studies uses a naïve expectation model
as a proxy for market expectation which makes the simplifying assumption that the expected
dividend equals the previous dividend paid out (Amihud and Murgia, 1997; Gerke, Oerke and
Sentner, 1997; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). In Germany, the time horizon for the market
to process public information into security prices, however, is relatively long as dividends are
usually paid on an annual basis. Thus, with yearly dividend payments this naïve model may
imply large forecast errors. Indeed, Andres etal. (2011) show that share prices react to the
surprise component of the announcement, not to the dividend change per se. We therefore
use analysts’ forecasts as proxy for market expectations. Dividend surprises are proxied by the
dividend estimation error which is calculated as the diﬀerence between the actual dividend and
the corresponding analysts’ forecast. In section 4.1 we provide evidence that suggests the use
of the dividend estimation error rather than the change in dividend as the appropriate measure
for dividend surprises.
Table 2: Evolution of Aggregate Tax Discrimination Variables Θy
Year Regime Individual Investor Corporate Investor Θy
Θyj % Θyj %
1996 FI 0.83 29.3 1.94 70.7 1.61
1997 FI 0.85 30.6 1.94 69.4 1.60
1998 FI 0.84 34.4 1.90 65.6 1.54
1999 FI 0.80 35.7 1.73 64.3 1.41
2000 FI 0.84 32.8 1.73 67.2 1.44
2001 FI/HI 0.84/0.74 33.2 1.73/1.00 66.8 1.44/0.92
2002 HI 0.74 34.3 1.00 65.7 0.91
2003 HI 0.76 33.9 1.00 66.1 0.92
2004 HI 0.78 34.0 1.00 66.0 0.92
2005 HI 0.78 33.3 1.00 66.7 0.93
2006 HI 0.78 30.9 1.00 69.1 0.93
This table presents the evolution of the economy-wide aggregate tax discrimination variable Θy from 1996 to 2006, and of
the shareholdings of domestic individual and of corporate investors, which are the aggregate equity ownership weights wyj
for investor’s Θyj in each sample year y (source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2008)). Individual investors are assumed to have
non-substantial long-term interest, thus capital gains are not taxed on the personal level. Capital gains of corporations and
institutions, however, are taxed with nominal tax rates on the personal level.
113.4 Data
The initial sample for our analysis comprises all ﬁrms included in the DAX, MDAX, or SDAX11
index as of December 31, 2002 (i.e. the 150 largest exchange-listed German ﬁrms). Our sample
period covers the years 1996 to 2006. German ﬁrms pay dividends on an annual basis. Thus,
our sample potentially consists of 1,650 ﬁrm-year observations. We exclude 312 ﬁrm-year ob-
servations, because it was not possible to identify the exact dividend announcement date. Data
on announcements are obtained from Reuters newswires. All accounting data items and share
price data are obtained from Thompson Financial’s Datastream database.
In line with Amihud and Li, we exclude ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial service sector (122 ﬁrm-year
observations). In addition, ﬁrm-years in which a ﬁrm has a control agreement12 in place (7
ﬁrm-years), or years in which ﬁrms acted as either acquirer or target in a corporate transaction
(11 ﬁrm-years) are dropped from the sample. 31 ﬁrm-year observations are excluded because of
missing data items. We keep those observations where a dividend and earnings announcement
were made on the same date. In order to control for the information conveyed by the earnings
announcement, we include the earnings surprise as a control variable in our analysis. We exclude
65 contaminated observations in which other value-relevant information (e.g. restructurings,
changes in the board etc.) is released on the same day as the dividend announcement. This
procedure results in a sample of 1,102 ﬁrm-year observations.
Andres etal. (2011) show that the dividend expectation error based on analysts’ forecasts
is a more appropriate measure of dividend surprises than dividend changes (naïve expectation
model). We employ I/B/E/S analysts’ forecasts13 as a proxy for the market’s expected dividend
payments. We use the arithmetic mean of the ﬁnal dividend forecasts made by the analysts
following a ﬁrm prior to the dividend announcement. Observations are excluded when no analyst
forecasts are available for the three months preceding the dividend announcement. We require
a ﬁrm to be covered by at least two analysts in any one year. This requirement leads to the
exclusion of another 181 ﬁrm-year observations and reduces the ﬁnal sample to 921 ﬁrm-year
observations.
Some of our sample ﬁrms (21 ﬁrms in 2002) have issued multiple share classes, usually shares
that carry a voting right along with non-voting preference shares. In these cases, we only include
the share class for which analyst forecasts are available in our sample.14 Special dividends are
included in our dividends per share measure. It has been pointed out in the literature (Goergen,
Renneboog and da Silva, 2005; Andres etal., 2009) that special dividends frequently reﬂect
permanent changes in dividend policy rather than transitory increases. However, large one-
oﬀ payments - which are associated with special anniversaries or the sale of subsidiaries - are
11The DAX (largest ﬁrms), MDAX (mid caps), and SDAX (small caps) are the three major indexes of Deutsche
Börse AG for ﬁrms from classic market sectors.
12Control agreements are deﬁned as agreements between a company and its parent company and take the form
of either Proﬁt and Loss Agreements or Subordination of Management Agreements.
13Data are taken from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) summary ﬁle. Support for the use
of I/B/E/S forecasts as proxy for market expectation comes from Brown et al. (2008), who document that
I/B/E/S dividend forecasts are an accurate proxy for market expectations in Germany as the dividend forecast
error is relatively low.
14It should be noted that focusing on one of the two share classes should not induce a bias in our analysis. A
closer look at these ﬁrms reveals that dividends on ordinary shares usually change along with dividends on
preference shares, a ﬁnding that conﬁrms the observations of Goergen, Renneboog and da Silva on German
ﬁrms during the period from 1984 to 1993.
12excluded. This procedure is also in line with previous studies on the dividend policy of German
ﬁrms (Behm and Zimmermann, 1993; Goergen, Renneboog and da Silva, 2005; Andres etal.,
2009).
We classify dividend announcements into three categories: Announcements that are 2.5%
higher (lower) than the expected dividend are classiﬁed as good (bad) news. If the announced
dividend lies in between the 5% range around the expected dividend, the announcement is classi-
ﬁed as no news. We also classify dividend announcements into dividend increases and decreases
using a 2.5% threshold. Dividend change by less than 2.5% are considered as unchanged div-
idends since many of these small changes reﬂect rounding changes.15 In 541 out of the 921
ﬁrm-year observations (59%), ﬁrms increased their dividends, 291 observations (32%) are as-
sociated with maintained dividends, and in only 89 ﬁrm-years (10%) dividend payments were
reduced. 349 announcements (38%) were considered to be good news, 329 observations (36%)
were classiﬁed as bad news. The distribution of dividend increases, decreases and unchanged
dividends mirrors broad market movements over the sample period suggesting that the compo-
sition of our sample is representative of all exchange-listed ﬁrms. The distribution of good news
and bad news announcements however is are relatively homogenous over the sample period.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Dividend Announcements Eﬀects and Market Expectations
Table 3 reports the event study results for unexpected dividends and dividend changes. Good
news and bad news announcements are further subdivided into dividend increases, decreases and
unchanged dividends. Dividend increases and decreases are further subdivided into good news,
bad news, and no news announcements (as deﬁned in section 3.4). We do not report results for
two subgroups with ten observations or less.
Our results show that dividend announcements that are good news to the market trigger pos-
itive AAR0, of 0.89% and a three-day CAAR−1,+1 of 1.29% (both highly signiﬁcant). Thereby,
positive dividend surprises are associated with positive abnormal returns, irrespective of whether
dividends are increased or unchanged and of whether returns are measured on announcement
day or the three-day interval around the announcement. In contrast, announcements of dividend
increases are not necessarily associated with positive abnormal returns if these announcements
are bad news to the market. While the AAR0 for all dividend increases amounts to 0.71% and
the three-day CAAR−1,+1 is 1.11%, abnormal returns on the event day are negative if the market
expected an even higher increase. Bad news are associated with signiﬁcantly negative abnormal
returns on the announcement day. Dividend decreases also trigger a signiﬁcantly negative share
price reaction on and around the event day. In both cases the share price reactions are more
pronounced when the dividend decrease represents bad news.16
15Rounding changes are usually due to stock splits or currency conversions from Deutsche Mark to Euro. It
should be noted that Amihud and Li use a threshold of 0.5%. Their sample is based on U.S. ﬁrms, which pay
dividends on a quarterly basis, leading to small changes. Since German ﬁrms pay dividends on a yearly basis,
dividend changes are usually comparatively large.
16In the other two cases (dividend reductions that are good news or no news) the number of observations is too
small to report reliable results.
13Table 3: Dividend Announcement Eﬀects




349 0.89% 5.64*** 5.58*** 1.29% 5.83*** 4.96***
Increases 309 0.94% 5.27*** 5.19*** 1.35% 5.49*** 4.54***
Decraeses 9 - - - - - -
No Change 31 0.57% 2.28** 2.12** 1.09% 1.95* 1.90*
Bad News 329 -0.25% 1.58 -2.38** 0.11% 0.11 0.10
Increases 107 -0.10% -0.54 -0.85 0.18% 0.44 0.12
Decreases 72 -0.93% -3.51*** -3.58*** -0.52% -1.69* -0.86
No Change 150 -0.22% -0.01 -0.07 0.36% 0.74 0.94
Dividend Changes
Increases 541 0.71% 4.84*** 4.46*** 1.11% 5.36*** 4.60***
Good News 309 0.94% 5.27*** 5.19*** 1.35% 5.49*** 4.54***
Bad News 107 -0.10% -0.54 -0.85 0.18% 0.44 0.12
No News 125 0.84% 2.48** 2.37** 1.34% 2.33** 3.07***
Decreases 89 -0.85% -3.42*** -3.48*** -0.29% -1.16 -0.35
Good News 9 - - - - - -
Bad News 72 -0.93% -3.51*** -3.58*** -0.52% -1.69* -0.86
No News 8 - - - - - -
This table presents the average abnormal returns on the announcement date, AAR0, and the cumulative average abnormal
returns, CAAR−1,+1, over the event window [-1;+1] estimated by the market model. The market index return is the return
realized by the CDAX value-weighted index and the coeﬃcients b αi and b βi are OLS estimates obtained from regressions
of ﬁrm i’s daily returns on the market return over the estimation window [-121;-2] relative to the announcement day
(t = 0)). Dividend announcements are classiﬁed in unexpected dividends and dividend changes. Good news and bad
news announcements are subdivided into dividend increases, decreases and unchanged dividends. Dividend increases and
decreases are subdivided into good news, bad news, and no news. The respective classiﬁcation threshold is 2.5%. The
test statistic proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and the non-parametric test statistic of Corrado (1989) are reported in
columns 4 and 5 and in columns 7 and 8, respectively. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**)
and 0.10(*)-level.
Our results clearly show that market expectations are an important determinant of the mar-
ket response to dividend announcements. However, the descriptive analysis does not answer the
question of whether the dividend surprise has explanatory power once we control for the divi-
dend change. We therefore employ a multivariate regression framework to test whether market
expectations or dividend changes are the determinants of dividend announcement returns. We
estimate three panel models based on the following equation:









In line with Bernheim and Wantz, CARiy, for stock i in year y is measured over the event
window [-1;+1] relative to the announcement date. The dividend estimation error, DIV ERRiy,
is calculated as (DIViy−ESTDIViy)/Piy, where DIViy is the total (adjusted) dividend per share
for stock i announced for year y, ESTDIViy is last I/B/E/S consensus mean dividend estimate
before the dividend announcement, and Piy is the share price 14 days before the dividend
announcement. The change in dividend yield, CDIV Yiy, is deﬁned as (DIViy − DIViy−1)/Piy,
where DIVi,y−1 is the total (adjusted) dividend per share for stock i for the preceding year y−1.
14In order to diﬀerentiate between the information content of the dividend estimation error and
of the change in dividend we ﬁrst estimate the information content of the dividend estimation
error and exclude CDIV Yiy from the model, i.e. δ1 = 1 and δ2 = 0. The second speciﬁcation
estimates the information content of the magnitude of the change in dividend yield, i.e. δ1 = 0
and δ2 = 1, and the third version includes both variables of interest, DIV ERRiy and CDIV Yiy,
i.e. δ1 = 1 and δ2 = 1.
In order to disentangle the eﬀects of simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements on
share prices, we include the earnings surprise as explanatory variable. The earnings estimation
error, EPSERRiy, is measured as (EPSiy − ESTEPSiy)/Piy, where EPSiy covers diluted
(adjusted) earnings per share for stock i announced for year y and ESTEPSiy is the estimated
earnings per share based on the last I/B/E/S consensus estimates prior to the announcement.
We set EPSERRiy equal to zero if the earnings and dividend announcements dates do not
coincide. We expect a positive relationship between earnings surprises that accompany dividend
surprises and the market response, α3 > 0.
To control for possible time variations due to time-related factors such as market sentiment,
the model includes time dummy variables: Y EARyi equals one if ﬁrm i’s announcement is made
in year y and zero otherwise. INDmi is an industry dummy variable following the classiﬁcation
of Deutsche Börse AG. All control variables are measured before the event and hence are known
to investors by the time of the announcement.
Table 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Market Expectations
Unexpected Dividends Dividend Changes
(1-1) (1-2) (1-3) (1-1) (1-2) (1-3)
DIV ERR 1.1069 - 1.0953 1.1569 - 0.9872
(5.10)*** (3.56)*** (5.07)*** *** (2.95)***
CDIV Y - 0.4694 0.0095 - 0.5133 0.1426
(2.38)*** (0.05) (2.96)*** (0.68)
EPSERR 0.0337 0.0346 0.0333 0.0125 -0.0074 0.0050
(1.04) (1.01) (1.02) (0.68) (-0.33) (0.25)
Constant -0.0033 -0.0040 -0.0160 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
(-0.51) (-0.50) (-1.63) (0.07) (0.05 ) (0.06)
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
N. of obs 678 678 678 630 630 630
R2 0.0874 0.0678 0.0874 0.0819 0.0654 0.0828
This table presents the results of equation 1 on the determinants of cumulative abnormal returns (random eﬀects GLS-
regressions) for unexpected dividends, i.e. good news and bad news announcements and dividend change, i.e. dividend
increase and decrease announcements. CAR is estimated over the event window [-1;+1] estimated by the market model.
The market index return is the return realized by the CDAX value-weighted index and the coeﬃcients b αi and b βi are OLS
estimates obtained from regressions of ﬁrm i’s daily returns on the market return over the estimation window [-121;-2]
relative to the announcement day). The dividend estimation error DIV ERR is calculated as the diﬀerence of the total
adjusted dividend per share and the estimated dividend using the last I/B/E/S consensus mean estimates before the dividend
announcement, standardized by the adjusted share price 14 days before the dividend announcement. CDIV Y , is the change
in adjusted dividends standardized by share price. EPSERR is the deviation of diluted (adjusted) earnings per share from
the estimated earnings per share using the last I/B/E/S consensus estimates before the announcement standardized by share
price. EPSERR is set to zero if the earnings and dividend announcements dates do not coincide. The models include year
and industry dummy variables corresponding to the classiﬁcation of Deutsche Börse AG. T-statistics from robust standard
errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.
We estimate three panel models based on equation 1 for the classiﬁcations of all unexpected
dividends, i.e. good news and bad news, and of all dividend changes, i.e. dividend increases and
decreases. We use the random eﬀects estimator which is favored over the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator
15based on a Hausman test.
The results presented in table 4 strongly conﬁrm that market expectations have a signiﬁcant
explanatory power for dividend announcement returns. The coeﬃcients of the dividend error
variable are positive and highly signiﬁcant while the coeﬃcients of the change in dividend yield
are insigniﬁcant when both variables are included (speciﬁcation 1-3 for unexpected dividends
and dividend changes). This suggests that dividend surprises and not dividend changes drive
the cumulative abnormal returns.
Our results also show that dividend surprises better explain abnormal returns than unexpected
earnings announcements that are made on the same day. The coeﬃcients of EPSERR are
insigniﬁcant for all model speciﬁcations in both classiﬁcations. This result is contrary to ﬁndings
in the literature (Leftwich and Zmijewski, 1994; Conroy, Eades and Harris, 2000) but supports
the ﬁndings of Cheng, Fung and Leung who also document that dividend surprises exert a
stronger pricing eﬀect than simultaneous earnings announcements.
The results presented in this section show that the naïve dividend announcement model seems
to be misspeciﬁed in the German institutional framework where regular dividends are paid an-
nually. Treating all dividend changes as surprises does not account for the ability of market
participants to incorporate information in stock prices when it ﬁrst becomes available. Our
results support the ﬁndings of Andres etal. (2011) and strongly suggest the use of dividend sur-
prises rather than dividend changes. Henceforth, we therefore use DIV ERRiy as a measure for
dividend surprises and test our hypotheses for the classiﬁcation of good news announcements.17
4.2 Evidence of tax eﬀects
A positive market response to positive dividend surprises is predicted by both, the signaling
and the agency cost theories. To the extent that the tax rate on dividends is historically lower
than that on capital gains under the full imputation system, we expect this tax diﬀerential
to strengthen this positive market response to dividend surprises. While we do not attempt
to isolate the eﬀects of the signaling and agency cost theories, it is necessary to control for
possible time-variations in the eﬀects of signaling and agency cost related factors. For example
a decrease in the market response to dividend surprises over the 2001TR might also be the result
of a generally declining information content due to generally reduced information asymmetries in
the stock market18 or due to reduced agency problems. Therefore, we include control variables
for information asymmetries, the rent extraction hypothesis and the free cash ﬂow hypothesis
in the following analysis.
We use a multiplicative interaction model with random-eﬀects GLS-regressions19 to test for
17In line with other studies (Bernheim and Wantz, 1995; Amihud and Li, 2006), we do not consider bad news
announcements. Bernheim and Wantz argue that market reactions to negative dividend surprises are likely
to be driven by fundamentally diﬀerent processes than those to positive reactions. While the CAAR−1,+1 for
good news announcements are signiﬁcantly positive, irrespective of whether a dividend has been increased or
continued (there are too few observations of good news for decreased dividends to report reliable results) we
ﬁnd a negative valuation eﬀect of bad news only for dividend decreases, but not for the sample of all bad news
announcements. These results indicate a diﬀerent valuation process of negative dividend surprises.
18Amihud and Li observe a decline in the information content of U.S. dividend announcements over time which
they claim to be attributable to reduced information asymmetries due to the increased stock holdings by more
sophisticated institutional investors.
19Based on Hausman tests, the eﬃcient random-eﬀects estimator is used in all panel regressions.
16tax eﬀects. We estimate the following model for our sample of good news announcements
CARiy = β0 + DIV ERRiy · [β1 + β2Θy + Ziyγ1] + Θy + Ziyγ2 +
16 X
m=1
β3nINDmi + eiy (2)
where Ziy is a vector of control variables V R1Diy, V R2Diy, CFV Riy, TQ1iy, EPSERRiy,
DIV Yiy, CDAXiy, COViy, LTV OLiy, and LEViy.
In order to proxy for the rent extraction hypothesis, we use a dummy variable for the exis-
tence of a controlling shareholder, V R1Diy, that equals one if the voting rights of the largest
shareholder exceed 25% and a dummy variable, V R2Diy, that equals one if there is a second
shareholder holding more than 5%. Data on ownership structures is collected from Hoppenstedt
yearbooks and Commerzbank’s "wer gehoert zu wem?" guides on an annual basis.20 As dividends
are paid on a pro-rata basis to all shareholders, they are a device for limiting rent extraction of
minority shareholders by large controlling owners (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003). Dividend sur-
prises provide new information about this conﬂict. In the presence of a controlling shareholder,
a positive dividend surprise should be regarded as a positive signal since it reduces the amount
of cash under the control of the dominant shareholder and therefore reduces the likelihood of mi-
nority shareholder expropriation. Thus, we expect positive coeﬃcients for V R1Diy. In contrast,
the risk of expropriation should be lower in ﬁrms with a second large shareholder, who has the
power and the incentive to control the dominant shareholder. We therefore expect the coeﬃcient
on V R2Diy to be negative. Since dividends are paid on a pro-rata basis, a divergence of cash
ﬂow rights and voting rights increases the incentives for the controlling shareholder to extract
funds through other channels than dividends. The cash ﬂow to voting rights ratio, CFV Riy,
is calculated for the ultimate controlling shareholder through various tiers of possible pyramid
ownership structure.21 As higher voting than cash ﬂow rights increases the incentives to extract
private beneﬁts, we expect a negative relationship between announcement returns and CFV Riy.
In order to control for the eﬀects predicted by the free cash ﬂow theory, we include TQ1iy,
which is a dummy variable that equals one if Tobin’s Q is below unity. Tobin’s Q is deﬁned as
the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided
by total assets. According to Jensen, managers in ﬁrms with high free cash ﬂows are tempted
to consume perks. This conﬂict is expected to be more severe in ﬁrms which have no valuable
growth opportunities as indicated by Tobin’s Q below unity. Therefore, we expect the coeﬃcient
on TQ1iy to be positive.
The dividend yield, DIV Yiy, calculated as DIV Yiy−1/Piy captures the eﬀects of factors that
aﬀect the level of the ﬁrm’s dividend yield and controls for clientele eﬀects. Bajaj and Vijh
argue that the stock price reaction following an unexpected dividend change should be more
pronounced in ﬁrms with high dividend yields if the investors in those ﬁrms have a preference
for stocks with a high yield. Thus, we expect the coeﬃcients on DIVY to be positive.
The cash ﬂow signaling hypothesis predicts that signaling information via dividend announce-
20During our sample period, shareholdings of more than 5% had to be registered with the German Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Shareholdings of less than 5% - even when reported in Hoppenstedt - were
excluded for reasons of data consistency.
21The calculation follows da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog. See Andres etal. (2011) for a more detailed
description of the calculation method.
17ments is of greater importance the greater the information asymmetries between managers and
shareholders. We use COViy, the number of analysts following a stock, as a proxy for informa-
tion asymmetry. For ﬁrms that receive more attention by analysts and investors information
asymmetry is reduced and hence is the information content of dividend surprises. Therefore, we
expect a mitigating eﬀect of coverage.22 Long-term volatility, LTV OLiy, deﬁned in line with
Amihud and Li as stock i’s standard deviation of monthly returns in the 24 months before the
months of the dividend announcement, is used as a further proxy for information asymmetry
between managers and shareholders. If dividend surprises are more informative in ﬁrms with
larger information asymmetry, one should expect a positive relation between long-term volatility
and dividend surprises.
Year dummy variables are excluded from the model because of the multicollinearity induced
by the yearly frequency of Θy. However, to control for non-tax time-related investor sentiment
factors, we include CDAXiy, the level of the CDAX market index on the announcement day.
As the general market movements over the sample period do not coincide with the decline in
Θy,23 a multicollinearity problem does not arises by the combined inclusion of Θy and CDAXiy.
The ﬁrm i’s leverage, LEViy, is deﬁned as the sum of total current liabilities and long-term debt
divided by book value of equity. Debt can be regarded as a substitutive corporate governance
instrument to dividends to reduce agency problems. We expect the market reaction of dividend
announcements to be negatively related to the ﬁrm’s leverage.
For our ﬁrst speciﬁcation (2-1), we impose the restriction γ1 = 0. Thus, only the tax discrim-
ination variable is allowed to aﬀect the response to dividend surprises. The second speciﬁcation
(2-2) imposes no restriction on the parameters and permits the dividend response coeﬃcient to
vary with all explanatory variables. The eﬀect of taxes on dividend responses can be determined
by examining β2. If β2 > 0, lower dividend taxation increases the market response to dividend
surprises, as predicted by hypothesis 2.
The results are presented in table 5. The coeﬃcients on Θy · DIV ERR are positive and
signiﬁcant for the reduced interaction model (β2 = 5.5072, t = 2.49) and the full interaction
model (β2 = 5.4330, t = 2.21), supporting Hypothesis 2. Lower taxes on dividends increase
the market response to dividend surprises. The coeﬃcient on CFV R is signiﬁcantly negative
in both speciﬁcations, implying that the market reaction is stronger in cases in which the con-
trolling shareholder is willing to increase (pro-rata) dividend payments despite strong incentives
to expropriate minority shareholders. The negative coeﬃcient for the dummy, capturing the
existence of a controlling shareholder, however, is inconsistent with the rent extraction hypoth-
esis. In line with previous studies (Amihud and Li, 2006), the magnitude of the announcement
returns is negatively related to analysts’ coverage.24 Cumulative abnormal returns are positively
related to simultaneous earnings surprises. Results from speciﬁcation (2-1) also suggest that the
market response is smaller the higher a ﬁrm is leveraged and when there is a boom in the stock
22We also use the market capitalization (in logarithm) of ﬁrm i’s total stock 14 days before the announcement.
Large ﬁrms usually receive more attention by analysts. This variable is highly correlated with the number of
analysts and its use as a proxy for information asymmetries is in line with previous studies such as Amihud
and Li.
23Our 11-year sample period covers an economic boom period until 2000, followed by an economic recession, and
a second boom period starting in 2003.
24The results using the ﬁrm size as proxy for information asymmetry between managers and shareholders are
qualitatively similar and therefore not reported.
18Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Dividend Taxation
(2-1) (2-2) (3-1) (3-2)
DIV ERR -4.2222 -0.7875 0.9710 4.6512
(-1.67) (-0.15) (1.32) (0.82)
Θy -0.0076 -0.0064
(-0.75) (-0.6)




FI · DIV ERR 2.7351 2.8810
(2.29)** (2.10)**
V R1D -0.0133 -0.0208 -0.0133 -0.0206
(-2.44)** (-3.00)*** (-2.42)** (-2.96)***
V R2D 0.0011 0.0117 0.0011 0.0117
(0.25) (1.99)** (0.24) (1.98)**
CFV R -0.0289 -0.0301 -0.0293 -0.0298
(-2.42)** (-1.73)* (-2.45)** (-1.71)*
TQ1 -0.0072 -0.0014 -0.0073 -0.0018
(-0.85) (-0.11) (-0.85) (-0.15)
EPSERR 0.2090 0.0871 0.2053 0.0898
(3.42)*** (0.70) (3.40)*** (0.72)
DIV Y 0.1324 0.3253 0.1260 0.3218
(0.97) (1.75)* (0.92) (1.73)*
CDAX -0.0139 -0.0104 -0.0139 -0.0103
(-3.01)*** (-1.62) (-3.00)*** (-1.60)
COV -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007
(-2.37)** (-2.14)** (-2.28)** (-2.14)**
LTV OL 0.0606 0.0911 0.0616 0.0918
(1.01) (1.15) (1.01) (1.15)
LEV -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012
(-1.90)* (-1.22) (-1.92)* (-1.22)
V R1D · DIV ERR 2.1904 2.1525
(1.52) (1.47)
V R2D · DIV ERR -3.0915 -3.0965
(-2.79)*** (-2.77)***
CFV R · DIV ERR 0.6228 0.4031
(-1.02) (-1.00)
TQ1 · DIV ERR -1.9377 -1.9359
(-1.02) (-1.00)
EPSERR · DIV ERR 19.3143 18.6148
(1.65)* (1.59)
DIV Y · DIV ERR -56.2980 -57.6353
(-1.44) (-1.44)
CDAX · DIV ERR -0.9508 -1.0320
(-0.74) (-0.79)
COV · DIV ERR 0.0607 0.0678
(0.87) (0.98)
LTV OL · DIV ERR -7.1667 -7.3377
(-0.38) (-0.39)
LEV · DIV ERR -0.0717 -0.0848
(-0.33) (-0.39)
Constant 0.0747 0.0604 0.0684 0.0547
(3.38)*** (2.22)** (3.53)*** (2.04)**
Year dummies NO NO NO NO
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
N. of obs 349 349 349 349
R2 0.1989 0.2358 0.1945 0.2327
This table presents the results of equations 2 and 3 on the determinants of cumulative abnormal returns (random eﬀects GLS-regressions).
Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated over the event window [-1;+1] estimated by the market model. The dividend estimation error,
DIV ERR is calculated as the diﬀerence of the total adjusted dividend per share and the estimated dividend using the last I/B/E/S consensus
mean estimates before the dividend announcement, standardized by the adjusted share price 14 days before the dividend announcement. Θy
measures the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains using economy wide ownership weights. FI is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if the full imputation system applies to the announced dividend and zero otherwise. The dummy for the largest shareholder, V R1D
takes a value of one if the voting rights of the largest shareholder in the respective ﬁrm before the announcement is larger than 25% and zero
otherwise. V R2D takes a value of one if the voting rights of the second-largest shareholder in the respective ﬁrm before the announcement
are larger than 5% and zero otherwise. The cash-ﬂow-to-voting rights ratio, CFV R, is calculated for the ultimate controlling shareholder.
Tobin’s q is deﬁned as the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity plus total assets minus book value of equity, all divided by total assets. TQ1 is a
dummy variable that equals one if Tobin’s Q is below unity. The earnings estimation error, EPSERR, is measured as the diﬀerence of diluted
(adjusted) earnings per share and the estimated earnings per share using the last I/B/E/S consensus estimates before the announcement
standardized by share price. EPSERR is set to zero if the earnings and dividend announcements dates do not coincide. DIV Y , is the
adjusted dividend in the preceding year relative to the adjusted share price 14 days before the dividend announcement. CDAX is the level of
the CDAX market index on the announcement day. COV is the total number of analysts covering the respective ﬁrm in the last I/B/E/S ﬁle
available before the announcement. LTV OL is the standard deviation of monthly returns in the 24 months before the months of the dividend
announcement. The ﬁrm’s leverage, LEV , is deﬁned as the sum of total current liabilities and long-term debt divided by book value of equity.
The models include industry dummy variables corresponding to the classiﬁcation of Deutsche Börse AG. T-statistics from robust standard
errors appear in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.
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One possible criticism to our analysis is that Θy may not be an appropriate measure of the
relative taxation of dividends and capital gains. Θy is constructed imposing assumptions on the
holding period of private investors and applying nominal tax rates on capital gains. Eﬀective
tax rates, while inherently diﬃcult to measure however can be signiﬁcantly lower. Moreover, Θy
is calculated using economy wide ownership weights to account for the diﬀerences in taxation
of diﬀerent investor classes. These weights will be inappropriate if a particular investor class
accounts for a disproportionate share of trading activity around the dividend announcement. To
address this objection, we reestimate speciﬁcations (2-1) and (2-2) replacing Θy by FI, which
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the full imputation system applies to the announced
dividend and zero otherwise:
CARiy = β0 + DIV ERRiy · [β1 + β2FI + Ziyγ1] + FI + Ziyγ2 + eiy. (3)
The estimation results of speciﬁcations (3-1) and (3-2) presented in table 5 show that the market
response to positive dividend surprises is more pronounced under the full imputation system than
under the half-income system. The coeﬃcients on FI · DIV ERR are positive and signiﬁcant
for the reduced interaction model and the full interaction model.
Our results suggest that the relative taxation of dividends to capital gains inﬂuences the
valuation implication of dividends. Nonetheless, since Θy tends to decline over the sample
period, another potential objection to this analysis is that our eﬀort to measure tax eﬀects
potentially only captures some spurious declining trend in the dividend response coeﬃcient
(Amihud and Li, 2006). In order to address this objection we use a testing procedure proposed
by Bernheim and Wantz and analyze whether changes in the market reaction are synchronized
with the 2001TR. If time series variations of the dividend response coeﬃcient are attributable
to changes in dividend taxation, we should observe a major shift in the market response to
dividend surprises around the 2001TR. However, within each tax regime the market response
should have been relatively stable.
We subdivide each tax regime into two subregimes: FI1 covers the 1996-1998 period and
FI2 the 1999-2001 period of the full imputation system, HI1 covers the 2001-2003 period,
and HI2 the 2004-2006 period of the half-income system. We reestimate the non-interactive
speciﬁcation and the full interactive speciﬁcation of equation 2 for each regime and subregime,
in each speciﬁcation omitting Θ, interactions involving Θ and year and industry dummies.
The dividend response coeﬃcients for each regime and subregime are then computed using
these estimates. For the non-interactive speciﬁcation, the dividend response coeﬃcients are
the coeﬃcients on DIV ERR. Diﬀerences between regimes and subregimes are statistically
evaluated using dummy variables in the respective OLS-regressions. For the full interactive
models, estimates for the dividend response coeﬃcients are evaluated at the mean values of the
independent variables for each regime and subregime. The signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences between
the mean dividend response coeﬃcients of diﬀerent regimes and subregimes is measured using
two-tailed t-tests.
Table 6 presents dividend response coeﬃcients for diﬀerent tax regimes and subregimes and
tests for diﬀerences across regimes and pairs of subregimes. The market response to dividend
20Table 6: Analysis of Structural Change
Dividend Response Coeﬃcients for Diﬀerent Time Periods
Tax Regime Obs. Non-Interactive Model Full Interactive Model
FI 165 3.56 (3.41) 5.73 (19.56)
FI1 91 4.95 (2.26) 4.41 (6.29)
FI2 74 3.06 (2.48) 6.04 (7.25)
HI 184 1.43 (2.28) 1.19 (5.66)
HI1 81 0.97 (0.73) 1.42 (3.10)
HI2 103 1.47 (1.99) 1.80 (3.05)
Diﬀerence in the Dividend Response Coeﬃcients
Tax Regimes Test Statistic P > t Test Statistic P > t
FI, HI t = 2.28 0.0230 t = 12.78 0.0000
FI1, FI2 t = 1.73 0.0850 t = 1.49 0.1365
FI2, HI1 t = 1.49 0.1400 t = 4.87 0.0000
HI1, HI2 t = 1.09 0.2790 t = 0.51 0.6101
This table presents the dividend response coeﬃcients, i.e. the derivate of CAR with respect to the dividend estimation error
for diﬀerent tax regimes and subregimes and the tests for diﬀerences across regimes and subregimes. Tax regimes are the full
imputation system (FI) until 2001 and the half-income system (HI) from 2001 depending on whether ﬁnancial year coincides
with calendar year. Each regime is divided in two subregimes: FI1 covers the 1996-1998 period, FI2 the 1999-2001 period,
and HI1 covers the 2001-2003 period, and HI2 the 2004-2006 period. The dividend response coeﬃcients are calculated using
the estimates of the non-interactive and the full interactive model of equation 2, respectively, each omitting Θ, interaction
terms involving Θ and industry dummies. For the non-interactive speciﬁcation, the dividend response coeﬃcients are the
coeﬃcients on DIV ERR. Diﬀerences between regimes and subregimes are statistically evaluated using dummy variables in
the respective OLS-regressions. For the full interactive models, estimates for the dividend response coeﬃcients are evaluated
at the mean values of the independent variables for each regime and subregime. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
The signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences between the mean dividend response coeﬃcients of diﬀerent regimes and subregimes is
measured using two-tailed t-tests.
surprises is positive and signiﬁcantly higher under the full imputation system than under the
half-income system, as predicted by hypothesis 2. This result holds irrespective of whether the
non-interactive or full interactive model speciﬁcations are considered. The results for the full
interactive model suggest that changes in the market response to a given magnitude of dividend
surprises were synchronized with the 2001 tax reform. While the dividend response coeﬃcients
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent within each tax regime (i.e. between the FI1 and FI2 or HI1
and HI2), the dividend response coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly higher in subregime FI2 than in
the ﬁrst years of the half-income system, HI1. Hence, the decline of the market response to
dividend surprises over both tax regimes seems to be attributable to 2001TR.25 However, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the dividend response coeﬃcient between the periods FI2 and HI1,
when the coeﬃcients are estimated with the non-interactive model. This result emphasizes the
importance of including non-tax related factors in our analysis of tax eﬀects on announcement
returns.
4.3 Holding-clientele based measure of marginal investor
One might object that in the preceding analysis the variation in tax rates is only present across
years and not across ﬁrms. In ﬁrms where the marginal investor’s dividend income is rela-
tively less tax-disadvantaged as compared to other investors, one would expect this tax eﬀect
to reinforce the signaling and agency cost eﬀects. In contrast, the announcement returns for
25As a robustness check, we also exclude dividends announced in close proximity to the reform (i.e. dividends
paid out of income earned in 2000 and 2001) to account for possible one-time eﬀects. We obtain qualitatively
similar results.
21stocks that are traded by relatively dividend tax-disadvantaged investors might be expected to
be mitigated by a negative tax eﬀect. In this section we address our third hypothesis and ex-
amine whether there are tax-related valuation eﬀects due to cross-sectional variations between
investors’ taxation.
We use a holding clientele-based measure of marginal investors that relies on ﬁrm-speciﬁc
equity ownership by diﬀerent investor classes to account for the tax attributes of the marginal
investor. Support for the use of the ownership structure as a proxy for the identity of the
marginal investor comes from Sias and Starks. They show that the likelihood of any particular
investor type being the marginal investor is positively related to the ﬁrm’s ownership structure.
We consider the tax status of shareholders at the ﬁrst tier. We compute the ﬁrm speciﬁc tax
discrimination variable, Θiy, by weighting the investor class speciﬁc Θyj with the ﬁrm-level
speciﬁc ownership structure of the share class observed, where wiyj is investor class j’s equity
ownership weight in ﬁrm i in year y: Θiy =
Pk
j wiyj · Θyj.
We diﬀerentiate between three types of shareholder classes in our analysis of ownership struc-
ture: Individuals with non-substantial interest, individuals with substantial interest and domes-
tic corporate investors. Due to insuﬃcient information of the individual tax status, shareholdings
of foreign investors are not considered. Information regarding the ownership structure is given
by Hoppenstedt yearbooks. A ﬁrm’s free-ﬂoat is split up according to the aggregate ownership
weights wyj used in section 3 between non-substantial individuals and corporate investors. The
ownership weights assigned to non-substantial individual investors are the aggregate ownership
weight of this class times the ﬁrm-speciﬁc free-ﬂoat. The ownership weights assigned to indi-
viduals with substantial interest are their respective shareholdings in a ﬁrm. The ownership
weights of domestic corporate investors are this class’ respective shareholdings in a ﬁrm plus
this class’ aggregate ownership weight multiplied by the ﬁrm’s free-ﬂoat.
The tax discrimination variables for each investor class, Θyj, are calculated under the following
assumptions: Individual shareholders are assumed to be in the highest tax bracket, as we argue
that predominantly the more wealthy individuals invest in stocks. Investors with non-substantial
interest are treated as long-term investors, i.e. capital gains are tax exempt, while capital gains
of individual investors with substantial interest are fully taxable with the personal income tax
rate. For corporate investors we assume that capital gains are taxed as corporate income so
that the relative tax burden for corporations is equal to that of individuals with taxable capital
gains.
Replacing Θy in equation 2 by our ﬁrm-speciﬁc tax discrimination variable, Θiy, we run the
following regressions in a reduced, γ1 = 0, and a full interaction model, γ1 = 1, for the full
sample over both tax regimes, for the full imputation system only, and the half-income system
only:
CARiy = β0 + DIV ERRiy · [β1 + β2Θiy + Ziyγ1] + Θiy + Ziyγ2 + eiy (4)
The results (not reported) show that for the full sample of good news announcements over
both tax systems, the coeﬃcients on Θiy ·DIV ERR are positive and signiﬁcant for the reduced
interaction speciﬁcation (β2 = 4.5540, t = 2.33) and the full interaction model (β2 = 4.4936,
t = 2.16), again supporting Hypothesis 2. However, if we run equation 4 separately for the
full imputation subsample and the half-income subsample, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect
22of Θiy. Varying the assumptions underlying the construction of Θiy, we tried several diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of Θiy without improving our results.
Hence, using a holding-clientele-based measure of individual stocks’ marginal investor, we do
not ﬁnd tax-related valuation eﬀects attributable to cross-sectional variations in investors’ tax-
ation. The results suggest, that either our holding-clientele-based measure of the tax properties
of the marginal investor is misspeciﬁed or that our results of tax eﬀects on dividend surprises
are primarily driven by time-series ﬂuctuations in the tax diﬀerential of dividends and capital
gains.
5 Conclusions
We investigate the impact of the 2001 tax reform in Germany on dividend announcement returns.
With this major tax reform, the full imputation system is replaced by the half-income system,
which has a signiﬁcant impact on the relative taxation of dividends and capital gains for most
investor classes. Under the full-imputation system, dividend income is preferred by German
investors that actively trade or have substantial stockholdings, by German individuals in lower
tax brackets and by domestic corporations. Long-term individual investors in higher tax brackets
and foreign investors prefer capital gains over dividend income. With the 2001TR, there is a
dramatic decline in the relative advantage of after-tax dividend income over capital gains for
most domestic shareholders.
In an event study framework we separate the tax eﬀect of dividends from their positive sig-
naling and agency cost eﬀects. We examine the evolution of the market response to dividend
surprises over the two tax systems and, in particular, how the market response to given magni-
tude of dividend surprise is related to the diﬀerential taxation of dividend and capital income.
Our sample is based on the 150 largest exchange-listed German ﬁrms over the period from 1996-
2006. Controlling for signaling and agency cost eﬀects of dividends we ﬁnd that the market
response to positive dividend surprises is more pronounced under the full imputation system
than under the half-income system. Our results suggest that the observed decline in the div-
idend response coeﬃcient is synchronized with the 2001 tax reform and hence attributable to
the 2001 tax reform. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the market reaction is related to the information
content of dividend announcements, with higher announcement returns in cases in which prior
market expectations were less optimistic.
Using a holding-clientele-based measure of individual stocks’ marginal investor, we do not
ﬁnd tax-related valuation eﬀects attributable to cross-sectional variations in investors’ taxation.
Separating the tax eﬀect of dividends from their positive signaling and agency cost eﬀects,
however, our study provides a more comprehensive picture of the valuation implications of
dividends in Germany.
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